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Abstract
We reconsider Banerjee and Lin [International Journal of Industrial Orga-
nization, 2003] by investigating the role of spillovers (or informational ows)
for the protability of input-price contracts in a vertically related industry.
We show that spillovers inuence the relative magnitude of the main forces
operating in the model, which can either reinforce or alter some of the pre-
dictions.
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1 Introduction
Technological activities are important determinants of the rmscompetitiveness.
The ability to deliver innovations is becoming increasingly important in a rapidly
evolving business environment and, in many instances, proves key to survival in the
market place. A large number of Research and Development (R&D) projects are
conducted in vertically related industries. That is, in industries consisting of both
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upstream and downstream rms. One can think of the upstream and the down-
stream rms as being input suppliers and nal good manufacturers, respectively.1
Within this supplier-customer context, rms can implement di¤erent input-price
contracts. Banerjee and Lin (2003) have proposed three di¤erent types of such con-
tracts: a oating-price contract, a xed-price contract, and an intermediatetype
of arrangement, a reference-price contract. The main di¤erence of these contract
types is the timing in the selection of input prices and R&D investments. In par-
ticular, a oating price contract requires that rst the downstream rms carry out
their R&D investments, then the input supplier sets the input price, and nally
the downstream rms compete in quantities. Because the input price is chosen
after rms do their R&D, the input supplier can adjust the input price in order to
extract rent from the research activity. This opportunistic behaviour on the part
of the input supplier, which tends to discourage R&D, can easily be overcome if
the upstream and downstream rms sign a xed input-price contract. According
to this contract type, the input supplier commits (credibly) not to raise the input
price after investment is sunk. This in turn promotes R&D and thereby increases
the purchase of the input from the supplier. Also, Banerjee and Lin (2003) contrast
these two contract types (oating-price contract and xed-price contract) with a
reference-price contract, under which the R&D and input price decisions are taken
simultaneously.
The analysis of Banerjee and Lin (2003) yields interesting insights into the role
of contract types for R&D activity and their desirability from the viewpoint of
the upstream as well as the downstream rms. However, the analysis rests on the
assumption of zero spillovers (or informational ows). This assumption is rather
restrictive particularly because nowadays the rapid change of technological progress
makes it more di¢ cult for rms to protect an invention by patenting it (Narula and
Hagedoorn, 1999). In addition to this, knowledge can be disclosed to rival rms
in other ways: industrial espionage, workers switching jobs and collaborative R&D
agreements.2 Indeed, considering the more plausible case of positive spillovers, we
investigate the desirability of the di¤erent contract types. We show that spillovers
inuence the relative magnitude of the main forces operating in the model, which
can either reinforce or alter some of the predictions.
1For instance, the computer industry ts well with description. In particular, the upstream
tier of the industry consists of suppliers of operating systems, such as Intel and Microsoft, and
suppliers of micro chips, such as Intel and Motorola. These upstream rms supply their inputs
to personal computer manufacturers, such as Toshiba, IBM, Hewlett Packard and Sony, among
others.
2In the context of joint research agreements, rms collaborate in R&D but still remain com-
petitors in the product market.
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2 The model
We modify the model of Banerjee and Lin (2003) by allowing for spillovers resulting
from the R&D activity. The industry consists one upstream and two downstream
rms, denoted respectively by U and Di, i = 1; 2.3 The upstream rm supplies a
key input to the downstream rms at a wholesale price w. The downstream rms
in turn transform the input into the nal product. There is one-to-one relation
between input and retail output. The downstream rms face a linear (inverse)
demand for their product p(Q) = a Q, with Q = q1 + q2 and a > 0. In addition,
the downstream rms carry out cost-reducing R&D investments xi at a cost x2i ,
implying a marginal production cost c + w   xi   xj, where  2 [0; 1] captures
the degree of spillovers, and c is the initial unit production cost with a > c (see d
Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988).
The timing in the model is as follows. Under a oating-price contract, the down-
stream rms choose simultaneously their R&D investments, then the input supplier
sets the price of the input, and nally downstream rms compete in quantities. Un-
der a xed-price contract, the timing for the rst two stages is reversed, that is, the
decision of the input supplier precedes the R&D decisions of the rms. Finally, un-
der a reference-price contract, the input supplier and downstream rms make their
decisions simultaneously at the initial stage of the game, and then the downstream
rms compete in quantities. The games are solved by backward induction.
We proceed to obtain the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the oating-price
contract. The prot function of a downstream rm Di is given by:
Di = (a  qi   qj)qi   (c+ w   xi   xj)qi   x2i , i 6= j; i; j 2 f1; 2g: (1)
Maximising prots with respect to qi gives rise to the rst order condition (foc)
A   w   2qi   qj + xi + xj = 0, where A  a   c is a measure of the market
size.4 The solution to the focs is the equilibrium of this stage game, q
i
= 1
3
(A  
w + (2   )xi + (2   1)xj). In the second stage, the input supplier chooses w to
maximise its prot wQ, where Q = 1
3
(2(A  w) + (1 + )(xi + xj)). The resulting
foc is 2A   4w + (1 + )(xi + xj) = 0.5 The solution to the foc is the equilibrium
of this stage game, w(xi; xj) = 14(2A+ (1 + )(xi + xj)). Using this expression, we
3We focus on a duopoly downstream as the number of rms is not important for the comparisons
across contract types.
4The second order condition (soc) is given by  2 < 0, so the foc is necessary and su¢ cient for
an (interior) optimum.
5The soc of this maximisation problem is given by  4 < 0:
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can readily identify the e¤ect of a unit increase in the R&D on Dis marginal cost:
@MCDi
@x
i
=  3
4
+

4| {z }
cost reduction
(2)
@MCDi
@x
j
=
1
4
  3
4| {z }
raising rivalscost
, i 6= j. (3)
Intuitively, a marginal increase in Dis R&D reduces own costs. Ceteris paribus,
this leads to an increase in the demand for Dis output, which in turn increases the
demand for input. As a result, the input supplier will charge a higher input price,
acting in an opportunistic manner (Banerjee and Lin, 2003). It is important to note
that even though a higher input price moderates some of Dis benets from R&D
(a negative incentive e¤ect), it also translates into higher input costs for the rival
downstream rm (a positive incentive e¤ect). The latter e¤ect, the so-called raising
rivals cost e¤ect, implies a strategic motive for Di to carry out R&D. Furthermore,
when  increases, the results of the R&D will spill-over to the rival rm so Di
will achieve a smaller overall cost reduction (see eq. (2)). The same is also true
regarding the magnitude of the raising rivals cost e¤ect, as eq. (3) indicates.
In the rst stage of the game, the prot function of Di is given by Di(xi; xj) =
(qi)
2   x2i . Maximising this with respect to xi and imposing symmetry xi = xj,
gives rise to the focs 5(1 + )(19  5)xi   (7  5)(2A  (5  7)xj) = 0. Solving
the system of the focs yields the equilibrium of this stage game, xFL
i
= (7 5)A
65 (2 5) ,
where the superscript FL denotes a oating-price contract.6 Then one can easily
obtain the rest of the equilibrium outcomes: qFL
i
= 12A
65 (2 5) ; w
FL = 36A
65 (2 5) ;
FLU =
864A2
(65 (2 5))2 and 
FL
Di
= 5(1+)(19 5)A
2
(65 (2 5))2 . This completes the analysis of the
oating-price scheme. The solution procedure for the the xed-price contract and
the reference-price contract is the same as above so the equilibrium outcomes are
relegated to the Appendix A.
3 Comparison
A oating-price contract implies that the input supplier increases the input price
after the downstream rms have conducted their cost-reducing investments. The
higher input price reduces the marginal returns to R&D and thereby tends to dis-
courage R&D. One way of overcoming the opportunistic behaviour of the input
6For  < (>)0:71, the R&D competition game is played in strategic substitutes (complements).
That is, @2i=@xi@xj = (7  5)( 5 + 7)=72 < (>)0 if and only if  < (>), where  ' 0:71.
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supplier implied by a oating-price contract is for both parties  upstream and
downstream to sign a xed-price contract. Under a xed price contract the input
supplier commits not to raise the input price after investment is sunk. Consequently,
the downstream rms will carry out more R&D while the supplier will make greater
wholesale prot by selling more input.
Proposition 1 The prot of the input supplier is ranked as FIU > 
R
U > 
FL
U for
all .
Proposition 1 conrms that the assumption of zero spillovers in Banerjee and
Lin (2003) does not alter the prot comparisons for the supplier across input-price
contracts.
The next Proposition contains the ranking of the downstream rmsprot.
Proposition 2 (i) A xed-price contract secures the highest prot for the down-
stream rms, FIDi > 
FL
Di
, FIDi > 
R
Di
for all .
(ii) There exists a threshold value ~ such that FLDi  RDi if and only if   ~,
and FLDi > 
R
Di
otherwise.
The main driving force behind part (i) is that a xed-price contract promotes
downstream R&D, which translates into higher output and prot. One might won-
der how the presence of spillovers in our setting a¤ects this result, which coincides
with Banerjee and Lin (2003). An understanding of the inuence that spillovers
have on the marginal returns to R&D and, as a consequence, on the equilibrium
prot, requires us to analyse how spillovers a¤ect the size of the two main forces
determining the desirability of a oating-price contract, namely, the cost reduction
and the raising rivals cost e¤ect. As can be seen from eq. (2) and (3), spillovers
tend to moderate both e¤ects. In particular, the size of cost reduction is reduced by
the term 
4
, whereas the raising rivals cost e¤ect becomes less important according
to the term 3
4
. The prospects of the R&D incentives under a oating-price contract
thus depend on the magnitude of these two terms. Clearly, the latter term is greater
than the former, which implies that it is less likely that a oating-price contract
will make the downstream rms better o¤ in the presence of spillovers. A nding
suggesting that the (implicit) assumption of perfect patent protection by Banerjee
and Lin (2003) is innocuousconcerning the relationship between oating-price con-
tracts and xed-price contracts in the present setting. This, however, does not hold
true regarding the relationship between oating-price contracts and reference-price
contracts, as part (ii) of Proposition 2 indicates.
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In particular, part (ii) reveals that when spillovers  are small enough, a oating-
price contract secures greater prot for the downstream rms; otherwise, a reference-
price contract leads to greater prot. This result reects the aforementioned raising
rivals cost e¤ect of a oating-price contract. Indeed, when  is relatively small, an
innovating rm can increase its rivals costs. In fact, it can do so without hurting
itself as much due to increases of the input price, which are induced via spillovers.
This in turn makes a oating-price scheme desirable.
Combining the results in Propositions 1 and 2, the following Corollary is imme-
diate:
Corollary 1 The interests of the input supplier and the downstream rms over the
choice of input-price contract can fully be aligned if and only if  > ~.
Corollary 1 implies that independently of the type of input-price contract em-
ployed, both the input supplier and the downstream rms in the pursuit of their
private interests can achieve an outcome that is collectivelybenecial. Particularly
this is the case in the present setting when the degree of spillovers is su¢ ciently
large.
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Appendix A.
A.1 Fixed-price contract
Equilibrium outcomes are as follows:
wFI =
A
2
; xFI
i
=
(2  )A
2(7  (1  )) ; q
FI
i
=
3A
2(7  (1  )) ;
FIDi =
(1 + )(5  )A2
4(7  (1  ))2 ; 
FI
U =
3A2
2(7  (1  )) : (4)
A.2 Reference-price contract
Equilibrium outcomes are readily shown to be the following:
wR =
9A
16  (1  ) ; x
R
i
=
(2  )A
16  (1  ) ; q
R
i
=
3A
16  (1  ) ;
RDi =
(1 + )(5  )A2
(16  (1  ))2 ; 
R
U =
54A2
(16  (1  ))2 : (5)
Appendix B.
Proof of Proposition 1 . We have the following comparisons:
FIU   RU =
3(2 +    2)2A2
2(7  (1  ))(16  (1  ))2 > 0
RU   FLU =
162(1 + )2(43  2 + 32)A2
(16  (1  ))2(65  (2  5))2 > 0:
It follows that FIU > 
FL
U . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. First we prove part (i). We have that:
FIDi   FLDi =
3(835 + 2400 + 3752   6883 + 3574   1205 + 256)A2
4(7  (1  ))2(65  (2  5))2 > 0:
Similarly, we establish the sign of the following di¤erence:
FIDi   RDi =
3(1 + )2(100  80 + 272   83 + 4)A2
4(7  (1  ))2(16  (1  ))2 > 0:
This completes part (i) of the proof.
Next we proceed to part (ii). Taking the di¤erence RDi   FLDi gives us:
7
9GA2
(16  (1  ))2(65  (2  5))2 ;
where G =  355 + 80 + 3902   163 + 294: The sign of this di¤erence depends
on G. Note that G =  355 if  = 0 and G = 128 if  = 1. Further, dG=d =
80 + 780   482 + 1163 > 0. Hence, there exists a critical value of the spillover
parameter dened as ~ = f j G = 0g. Straightforward calculation yields ~ ' 0:85.
Indeed, RDi > 
FL
Di
if and only if  > ~. Q.E.D.
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